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NUNO GAROUPA & JUD MATHEWS*
Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference:
Explaining the Comparative Law
of Administrative Reviewt
This paper offers a theory to explain cross-national variation in
administrative law doctrines and practices. Administrative law re-
gimes vary along three primary dimensions: the scope of delegation to
agencies, agencies' exercise of discretion, and judicial practices of def-
erence to agencies. Working with a principal-agent framework, we
show how cross-national differences in institutions' capacities and the
environments they face encourage the adoption of divergent strategies
that lead to a variety of distinct, stable, equilibrium outcomes. We ap-
ply our model to explain patterns of administrative law in the United
States, Germany, France, and Commonwealth jurisdictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we develop a general model to explain cross-na-
tional variation in administrative law regimes. We focus on
explaining three features in particular: legislative practices of delega-
tion to agencies, the exercise of discretion by agencies, and the
application of deference by reviewing courts to agency actions. We
show how these features of an administrative system are linked to
one another in ways shaped by the background features of the legal
and political system.
The emerging field of comparative administrative law has high-
lighted significant cross-national differences in administrative law
processes and institutions, including the different roles played by
courts.1 Of course, administrative law is just one of the many dimen-
sions along which national legal and political systems vary, with
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Matthew Finkin, Bernd Grzeszick, Enrico Peuker,Werner Heun, Zlia Gil Pinheiro,
Matthias Ruffert, and members of the Illinois College of Law Junior Faculty Forum
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research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1. For a recent and concise overview of the field, see Francesca Bignami, Com-
parative Administrative Law, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAw 145
(Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012). See generally COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRA-
TiVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010).
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others including constitutional structure, legal tradition, and the or-
ganization of the economy (for example, the size of the public sector
and the influence of the state as an economic actor). While scholars
have catalogued cross-national variation in administrative arrange-
ments, few to date have tried to explain the sources of that variation
systematically. The work of drawing connections between variations
in administrative law and these other legal and political differences
remains in its early stages.2
In the United States, by contrast, scholars have made substan-
tial progress applying political economy theories to explain the
distinctive features of the American administrative process. Political
economy theories start from the view that institutional arrangements
are the product of competition among interested stakeholders, compe-
tition that is shaped in important ways by the fixed features of the
legal and political landscape. 3 Pioneering works in this vein include
influential accounts explaining the prominence of public participa-
tion, 4 judicial review,5  and citizen lawsuits in American
administrative procedure. 6 Others offer explanations for when and
why legislatures choose to delegate broadly to administrative agen-
cies, 7 and why Congress sometimes favors regulation by agency as
opposed to courts.8 In a different article, one of us has explained why
agencies face deep uncertainty over what measure of deference their
interpretations of statutes will receive from courts-a deference lot-
tery-and how this might affect agency behavior.9
Few scholars have extended the political economy model to ad-
ministrative law in other jurisdictions. Some have offered political
2. See MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 3
(1995) (noting that "[m]uch more could be done to explore the effect on institutional
design of different constitutional arrangements, including the impact of different rela-
tionships between the legislature and the executive"). A number of works have
explained the administrative structures of a given country with reference to the politi-
cal, institutional, and legal context. See, e.g., Mariana Mota Prado, Presidential
Dominance from a Comparative Perspective: The Relationship Between the Executive
Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw,
supra note 1, at 225. What has been in shorter supply has been scholarship building a
general theory of institutional choice in public administration that explains cross-na-
tional variation.
3. See Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI.
739 (1984).
4. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Po-
litical Control, 3 J. LAw, ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
5. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., The Political Origins of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 15 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 1 (1999).
6. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Over-
looked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
7. JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE INSTITU-
TIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002).
8. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncer-
tainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1035
(2006).
9. Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 1349 (2013).
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economy explanations for why particular organizational forms are fa-
vored for addressing particular public policy issues, 10 and for
distinctive features of international administrative regimes.'1 But
the central thrust of these works has not been to explain cross-na-
tional variation in basic structures of administrative law and
administrative process, and most have had very little to say about the
role of courts. One recent piece by two prominent American scholars
did focus precisely on this question, but the authors conclude that
political economy theory comes up short: it can account for some, but
not all, of the observed cross-national differences. 12
Elizabeth Magill and Daniel Ortiz begin their analysis by noting
that there is a significant institutional difference that explains the
more limited use of courts outside of the United States, namely, par-
liamentary versus presidential political regime. 13 In a principal'
agent environment, with a parliamentary regime and unified govern-
ment, agents cannot really defect from the principal's preferences
because it is easy to pass new legislation to correct possible agency
innovations. Whereas in the American model judicial review is per-
ceived as a check against deviant agencies, in the European model
judicial review should be limited, they argue, because the principal's
preferences are easily and readably observable.
These variations might explain the perceived differences be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom. However, once
France and Germany are included, the simple political economy
model fails to provide good insight. Not only is administrative review
surprisingly more relevant in France than the model would antici-
pate, but also the variations between France and Germany are
difficult to understand.
What distinguishes our approach from the Magill and Ortiz ac-
count, and what gives it additional explanatory power, is explicit
attention to differences in the courts available to the administrative
process. Drawing in part on the comparative work that one of us has
done on judicial systems, 14 we show how institutional differences in
the courts that can be enlisted to monitor agency behavior alter the
strategies available to other stakeholders.
10. See, e.g., HORN, supra note 2; FABRIzIo GILARDI, DELEGATION IN THE REGULA-
TORY STATE: INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES IN WESTERN EUROPE (2008); THE
POLITICS OF DELEGATION (Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002).
11. Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolu-
tion of Administrative Law in International Organizations, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 319 (2005).
12. M. Elizabeth Magill & Daniel R. Ortiz, Comparative Positive Political Theory,
in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 1.
13. Id. at 136-37.
14. See Nuno M. Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Or-
ganization of the Judiciary, 4 J. COMP. L. 226 (2010).
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We start by recognizing that, in a complex world, law is incom-
plete by nature. 15 The legislator cannot anticipate all possible future
contingencies. Even if the legislator could predict all possible future
states of the world, it would probably be too costly to draft sufficiently
detailed legislation. Furthermore, there are cheaper mechanisms to
fill in the gaps in legislation when needed rather than anticipating
them. Consequently, legislators draft incomplete statutes ex ante
that need to be completed by regulators and courts ex post. Adminis-
trative law provides the conceptual mindset for this allocation of
work across legislature, agency and courts.
If incompleteness of law is a reality across jurisdictions, re-
sponses to the problem vary. Our model shows that contextual
variables shape how jurisdictions respond to the challenges imposed
by the inevitable incompleteness of the law. The respective roles
played by legislatures, agencies, and courts in the administrative law
regime are determined in part exogenously, owing to a system-spe-
cific set of constitutional constraints, and in part endogenously,
through strategic interaction among the institutions against the
backdrop of those constraints.
By looking at transaction costs and political structures, our pa-
per explains why the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth
jurisdictions differ from the United States, but also why Germany
and France present an interesting diversity. The dominant strategies
in each jurisdiction are consistent with institutional constraints
which we treat largely as exogenous to the model. We characterize
four possible arrangements, with variations in the degree and kind of
autonomy of the agencies and courts.
While a transaction cost perspective on legislative drafting is
common to political economy treatments, explicitly considering varia-
tion in judicial institutions expands the explanatory power of our
approach. If the kind of courts available to review administrative ac-
tion are, for reasons beyond the legislature's control, reliable and
predictable in the performance of their duties, then the legislature
may be able to enlist them as effective monitors of agency perform-
ance. If, on the other hand, the available courts are unreliable or
unpredictable, then building them into the administrative process
can introduce a new source of variability into administrative pro-
grams, and new possibilities for subverting the legislature's policy
agenda. Strikingly, when unreliable courts have a wide scope of re-
view over the merits of administrative action, grants of discretion to
agencies may ultimately amplify the courts' capacity to shape admin-
15. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Katharina Pistor & Cheng-
gang Xu, Incomplete Law: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its
Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation, 35 J. INT'L LAW & POL.
931 (2003).
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istration. Legislatures do well to take account of the interactions they
anticipate between courts and agencies when they design programs
and regulate the scope of judicial review, and our model predicts that
the interactions among all three institutions will fall into one of sev-
eral possible patterns.
In Section II, we explain the basic model in the context of the
principal-agent theory. We consider the possible strategies of the dif-
ferent actors and provide basis for the analysis of the possible
solutions.
In Section III, we detail the contextual and institutional determi-
nants of behavior. We argue that the payoffs for each actor respond to
the degree of government concentration and the character of legal in-
stitutions. They explain why different jurisdictions can illustrate the
possible solutions to the model.
In Section IV, we frame each of the possible solutions in terms of
the autonomy of agencies and courts. We argue that the solutions of
the model can be understood in a common framework. These varia-
tions are discussed in more detail in reference to specific
jurisdictions.
Section V concludes the article.
II. THE THEORY
This section explains how we model the phenomena we seek to
explain. We work from the inside out, first describing in generic
terms the relevant institutional actors, the choices each must make,
and the processes that link them. The following section then fills in
the institutional context, describing relevant variations in the struc-
ture of legal and political systems, and explaining how these
variations affect the set of options open to the actors and the payoffs
from them.
At root, we are interested in the interaction between three insti-
tutions: the legislature, an agency, and a reviewing court. The basic
sequence of events is straightforward: the legislature designs a pol-
icy, the agency implements it, and the court reviews the agency's
implementation.
The role of each player is readily conceptualized in terms of prin-
cipal-agent theory: a principal (the legislature) appoints an agent
(the agency) to carry out a task (the execution of a statute), and also
enlists a monitor (the court) to supervise the agency's performance. 16
Principal-agent theory also captures the basic tension that animates
this tripartite relationship: the legislature would like the agency to
16. The principal is the actor with less information, and the agent is the actor
with more information. This information asymmetry creates transaction costs. Politi-
cal economy studies how institutional design reduces these transaction costs.
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carry out its wishes faithfully, but ensuring the fidelity of the agency
may be costly, if not impossible. The legislature can use the court to
monitor agency performance, but the legislature's relationship to the
court is subject to its own set of agency control problems.
Each of the players has one or more choices to make about how it
will perform its task. For each institution, the payoff from any choice
depends not only on that choice, but also on the choices made by the
other institutions. Hence, we can readily think about the relationship
as a game, as the term is used in game theory, and the choices the
players must make as moves in that game.
Below, we characterize in generic terms the moves each player
has to make, and the set of possible options-the strategies-availa-
ble to each. For simplicity's sake, we suppose that each player can
choose between two strategies for each move, where the two strate-
gies characterize the different ends of a spectrum of possible options
open to the players. 17
A. Legislature
The legislature must make two choices: it must (a) make a stat-
ute-specific decision about how to delegate authority, and (b) set
global rules about the scope of judicial review over agency policy
decisions.
With respect to the first decision, the legislature can choose be-
tween a narrow delegation and a broad delegation. That is, on the one
hand, the legislature could choose to draft a detailed statute, hem-
ming in the scope for agency discretion. On the other hand, the
legislature could draft a more open-ended statute, in effect delegating
to the agency broad latitude to use unverifiable expertise-that is,
specific human capital that cannot be directly observed by the
legislature.
Generally speaking, the legislature's choice will depend on the
cost of writing detailed statutes, on the alignment of interests be-
tween legislature and agency, on the ability to rely on courts
(monitors), and on the possibility of palliatives (using other strate-
gies, including the "fire alarm" strategy of putting triggers in the
statute to make agency missteps highly public).' 8 We will discuss
these factors further below.
With respect to the second decision, the legislature has the
chance to control, or at least shape, the scope of review exercised by
the monitoring court. To be clear, it is beyond the powers of legisla-
tures to set the scope of constitutional review exercised by courts, but
17. As we discuss below, players may also choose "mixed strategies" alternating
between different strategies.
18. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 6.
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legislatures do have the power to set the scope of statutory review,
even if in practice they often merely codify existing judicial norms. 19
The legislature can, for instance, provide that courts can only
strike down agency acts that are ultra vires-beyond the limits of
their granted power-but may not review the merits of agency policy
choices. This is the rule in Britain, at least as a formal matter.20 On
the other hand, the legislature may grant courts more probing review
that reaches into the merits. For example, the American Administra-
tive Procedure Act appears to give courts de novo review power over
agency interpretations of law.2 1 More generally, legislatures deter-
mine which administrative decisions are subject to review and which
are insulated from review entirely. While legislatures can delegate
more or less power varying from statute to statute, generally their
choices about scope of review are contained in framework statutes
that apply globally. In other words, in choosing a scope of review
strategy, legislatures should consider what overall strategy would
work best across the entire run of statutes: narrow review, or broad
review.
Granting courts the authority to review the merits of agency de-
cisions empowers courts to monitor agency performance more
aggressively. However, it also expands courts' capacity to substitute
their own policy judgments for the agency's, under the guise of ensur-
ing fidelity to the statute.
Taking the legislature's two choices together, we see four possi-
ble strategies: (1) broad delegation with broad review (general statute
with powerful courts), (2) broad delegation with narrow review (gen-
eral statute with weak courts), (3) narrow delegation with broad
review (detailed statute with powerful courts), and (4) narrow delega-
tion with narrow review (detailed statute with weak courts).
B. Agency
The agency must decide how to implement the statutes it is
charged to administer; in other words, how to exercise its discre-
tion.22 Of course, the permissibility of different agency actions will
depend on the terms of the delegation from the legislature.
19. And indeed, courts may be able to use constitutional grounds for review to
evade legislative efforts to limit the scope of statutory review.
20. Paul Craig, Competing Models of Judicial Review, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE CONSTITUTION 373, 374 (Christopher Forsyth ed., 2000).
21. Administrative Procedure Act § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1946).
22. The administrative law doctrine of many jurisdictions defines "discretion"
rather formalistically, and considers agencies to be applying discretion only in circum-
stances when a statute explicitly confers on the agency the power to make a choice.
See, e.g., Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Discretion in German Administrative Law: Doctri-
nal Discourse Revisited, 6 EuRo. PUB. LAW 69, 69 (2000) (discussing the doctrinal
definition of discretion in German administrative law). We take a functional view of
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
Two strategies can be identified. One strategy is to play it safe
and implement the statute in the least controversial, most defensible
manner possible. An agency playing it safe will choose among possi-
ble actions based on how easily they can be justified with respect to
the statutory scheme they are charged with implementing. A second
strategy is to apply unverifiable expertise, by which the agency uses
specific human capital to implement the statutes. Agencies will be
more constrained in their ability to apply expertise when the scope of
their delegation is narrow than when it is broad.
Applying expertise in a policy domain may result in the agency
choosing a policy other than the safest, most readily defensible one.
However, by applying expertise, the agency may be better able to re-
alize the preferences of the legislature than it could by playing it safe:
indeed, legislatures delegate to agencies precisely in the hope of reap-
ing the benefits of their expertise. However, at the same time, in
applying unverifiable expertise, agencies may also be in a position to
serve their own preferences at the expense of the principal's. So the
agency's assertion of "expertise" may be genuine, and promote the
principal's goals efficiently, or it may be a smokescreen for the agency
to promote its own agenda (which in a presidential system may be the
president's agenda). In other words, "expertise" can be a vector for
the introduction of agency slack, and it may be difficult or costly for
those outside the agency to discern the agency's true motive behind
invoking expertise.
In choosing which course of action to take, an agency's priorities
could include (1) surviving judicial review, (2) pursuing their own pol-
icy preferences, and (3) applying expertise to fulfill the principal's
objectives. These priorities should respond to a particular institu-
tional context. For example, if defections from the legislature's
objective are easy to detect, and a defecting agency can be easily re-
shuffled or otherwise disciplined, there is little sense in pursuing
objectives different from those of the principal. At the same time, if
the principal can directly punish defection, the role of judicial review
is of second-order importance. As agencies evolve into more indepen-
dent institutional modes (as observed in the last decades and in many
contexts due to external pressure such as EU membership), all these
priorities are affected.
C. Court
The monitor (the court) has to determine whether to uphold or
strike down the agency's action.
discretion, and consider an agency to be exercising discretion whenever it is making a
choice about how a statute should be administered.
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The court must make the choice in light of three principal consid-
erations: (1) whether the legislature's delegation to the agency is
narrow or broad, (2) whether the agency's action plays it safe or ap-
plies unverifiable expertise, and (3) whether the scope of the court's
own power of review is narrow or broad.
The court's goals could include (1) fidelity to the principal, (2)
pursuing their own policy preferences, and (3) minimizing work or
conflict.
Crucially, the payoff for the court from its choice of strategy de-
pends not only on the scope of review granted to it by the legislature,
but also by the scope of the legislature's delegation to the agency, and
how the agency uses its discretion. If the legislature's delegation to
the agency is narrow, then it is more straightforward to evaluate
whether or not the agency is compliant with the statute: if the agency
plays it safe, it should be upheld, and if it applies expertise where the
narrowness of the statute forbids it, the agency should be overturned.
On the other hand, if the scope of delegation is broader and the
agency chooses to apply expertise, the court will have substantial lat-
itude to decide whether the agency is doing so in a manner faithful to
the statute. In other words, a broad delegation to the agency effec-
tively adds to the scope of the court's power of review, unless the
legislature has taken pains to limit the scope of review. For instance,
suppose a statute instructs an agency to set the maximum level of
some air pollutant "requisite to protect the public health." Just as
there's no level that is obviously wrong, under such a vague standard,
there is no level that is obviously right. No matter what the agency
does, the statute provides little protection against a court that wants
to overturn the agency's choice, when that court's own powers of re-
view are quite broad.2 3 Like the agency, the court may be genuinely
interested in promoting the ends of the statutory scheme, or it may
prefer to use its reviewing power to pursue interests of its own. Con-
versely, the agency may be able to protect itself against judicial
reversal to some extent by playing it safe even when the statute li-
censes a broader exercise of discretion; a reviewing court cannot
credibly claim under those circumstances that the agency's action vi-
olates the statute.
III. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Officials act within the context of a strategic environment struc-
tured by fixed features of their regimes, many of which are
23. See, e.g., Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (The
Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (invalidating OSHA's choices of benzene exposure
levels on the grounds that OSHA should have been requiring proof of a significant
degree of harm from higher levels, notwithstanding the absence of any such require-
ment in the statute).
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constitutional in character. We treat these regime-level features as
exogenously given: they make up the environment in which officials
operate, and they cannot be changed in the short term. Of course, the
constitutional and institutional features of regimes are themselves
the products of political processes, but these basic structures are not
up for grabs in the "ordinary politics" of legislative enactment. Con-
stitutional rules, for instance, are typically protected by super-
majority requirements. 24
These environmental features are extremely important to the
outcome of the "game" we analyze, because they constrain the moves
that officials can make and determine the payoffs of those moves. We
can subsume the most important factors under two broad headings:
(1) government concentration, and (2) legal institutions that are rele-
vant for how they shape the legislature's relationship with the agency
and the reviewing courts, respectively. Effectively, these factors mat-
ter insofar as they bear on the autonomy of the agency and the court,
as discussed below.
The degree of government concentration matters for several re-
lated reasons. First, divided government increases the costs of
writing detailed statutes that constrain agency discretion ex ante. 25
This is so because transaction costs increase as more players have to
be involved in statute drafting. 26 Second, divided government limits a
legislative majority's ability to shape the selection of regulators. The
more players have an effective veto over the regulator, the more pref-
erences must be taken into account in choosing one, with the result
that the regulator's preferences will probably align less closely with
the median legislator's. Lastly, concentrated governments can direct
the activities of regulators and dismiss defecting regulators more eas-
ily than divided governments.27
There are several dimensions to divided government that are rel-
evant in this context. Federalism can matter, depending on how it
bears on the administrative process. For instance, federalism may be
24. The constitutional features are the outcome of a meta-game that is exogenous
for the purposes of our analysis. It could be that administrative law and judicial re-
view shape the payoffs of the meta-game (that is, constitutional features could in part
reflect concerns with administrative law and judicial review), but given the stability
and duration of such constitutional features, we take them as given in our analysis.
Note the role of history and path dependence in establishing a set of exogenous
features.
25. For our purposes, the more veto players have a stake in decisions, the more
divided government is. A veto player is "an individual or collective actor whose agree-
ment is required for a policy decision." George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political
Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and
Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 289, 293 (1995).
26. See HUBER & SHIPAN, supra note 7.
27. See generally HORN, supra note 2, at 13-14; HOWARD ROSENTHAL, PARTISAN
POLITICS, DIDED GOVERNMENT, AND THE ECONOMY (1995); GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO
PLAYERS: How POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK (2011).
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relevant if it means that national policies are carried out by subna-
tional agencies which are accountable to subnational officials. This
kind of arrangement has the potential to create more competition of
vested interests in the administration of law. On the other hand,
when federalism takes the form of strictly separate spheres of na-
tional and subnational administration, it will not matter for our
purposes. 28
A second aspect is the party structure, which is, of course, par-
tially a function of a country's electoral rules.29 The more parties in a
system, the less likely it is that any one party will possess the legisla-
tive majority necessary to pursue its agenda. In a two-party system,
the majority party in a legislative chamber should be able to push a
well-defined set of priorities, assuming some party discipline. On the
other hand, when parties must join in coalition to form a majority,
the different groups within the coalition will support different sub-
stantive agendas. 30
A third factor, the distinction between presidential and parlia-
mentary regimes, simply amplifies the concentration or division of
government power. Parliamentary systems link control over the exec-
utive to control over the legislature, while presidential systems split
the two. The consequences will vary, depending on party structure.
For instance, most of the time in the United Kingdom and Germany,
the executive and legislature are controlled by a small group led by
the prime minister.31 In the United States, leaving aside personal
styles, there is no similar concentration of power. France is some-
where in the middle, because the executive and legislature are
sometimes dominated by the same party, while at other times there
is the "cohabitation" of different parties. 32
Thus, these elements-political system, party system, and feder-
alism-play important roles in determining the costs of drafting a
more detailed statute, the likelihood of alignment of preferences be-
tween the principal and the agency, and the possibility of effective ex
post control. Through all of these channels, divided government thus
contributes to the effective autonomy of agencies vis-A-vis the legisla-
ture. Interbranch divided government-divergent party control of the
legislative and executive branches-means a legislative majority can-
not necessarily dominate the appointment or oversight of agency
28. THOMAS 0. HUEGLIN & ALAN FENNA, COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: A SYSTEMATIC
INQUIRY 35-36 (2006). See also Vivien A. Schmidt, The EU and its Member-States:
Institutional Contrasts and their Consequences, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 128 (1997).
29. See generally GARY W. Cox, MAKING VOTES COUNT: STRATEGIC COORDINATION
IN THE WORLD'S ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1997).
30. See MICHAEL LAVER & NORMAN SCHOFIELD, MULTIPARTY GOVERNMENT: THE
POLITICS OF COALITION IN EUROPE 186-92 (1998).
31. DUNCAN WATTS, UNDERSTANDING US/UK GOVERNANCE 89 (2003).
32. Jean V. Poulard, The French Double Executive and the Experience of Cohabi-
tation, 105 POL. ScI. W. 243 (1990).
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personnel; and intrabranch divided government-divergent party
control of the legislative houses-increases the difficulty both of con-
straining agency behavior through detailed statutory mandates or
through effective ex post oversight. The problems compound one an-
other: it is legislatures in divided governments that might find
detailed statutory mandates most useful as devices to constrain
agency behavior, owing to the alignment problem, but they also find
it most difficult to enact them. These factors also shape the impor-
tance of courts, in ways to be described further below. 33
There are several aspects to legal institutions that may matter
as well. Key features that tend to distinguish continental and com-
monwealth systems include (1) recognition vs. career judiciary
(selection and appointment of judges 34), and (2) specialized jurisdic-
tion in administrative law.35 Commonwealth systems traditionally
combine recognition judiciaries with the involvement of ordinary
courts in administrative review, both of which tend to mean that the
judiciary stands far apart from the administration and operates with
a higher degree of autonomy than in continental systems. By con-
trast, continental systems tend to rely on career judiciaries and a
specialized, bureaucratized jurisdiction in administrative law.36
These legal institutional factors, too, are relevant for the dynam-
ics under study insofar as they bear on autonomy-here, the
autonomy of the reviewing court. To be clear, in civil law systems as
well as common law systems, courts review agency action with a high
degree of independence from the other branches of government.37
Call this autonomy from the other branches of government "horizon-
tal autonomy." However, the specialized administrative courts
typical of civil law jurisdictions are commonly embedded in judicial
bureaucracies that exert real constraints on the effective autonomy of
individual judges. Typically, the professional stature of administra-
33. More generally, see R. KENT WEAVER & BERT A. ROcKMAN, Do INSTITUTIONS
MArrER?: GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD (1993).
34. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Hybrid Judicial Career Structures: Reputa-
tion vs. Legal Structure, 3 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 411 (2011).
35. Nuno Garoupa & Carlos G6mez Liguerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of
the Common Law, 29 B. U. INT'L. L.J. 287 (2011).
36. Canonically, a key difference between judging in civil law and common law
countries is the reliance on case law and binding precedent in the latter. See, e.g.,
Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15
AM. J. CoMP. L. 419, 425 (1967). There is reason to suppose, somewhat counter intui-
tively, that reliance on case law and precedent can enhance the effective autonomy of
judges, by providing them with a resource they can deploy strategically, choosing
among available lines of cases to justify a preferred outcome. However, the distinction
is of little relevance when it comes to administrative law, where case law and prece-
dent matter significantly in many civil law jurisdictions. Any resulting effect on
judicial autonomy would likely be limited.
37. Dominique Custos, Independent Administrative Authorities in France: Struc-
tural and Procedural Change at the Intersection of Americanization, Europeanization,
and Gallicization, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 1.
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tive judges in such systems depends on more senior judges'
evaluations of the quality and consistency of their work.38
So even while the administrative judiciary as a whole may enjoy
a large measure of horizontal autonomy from the other branches of
government, its judges lack the "vertical autonomy" of, for instance,
federal judges.in the United States, who enjoy life tenure in a high
stature position. Judges with high vertical autonomy are less con-
strained in their judging, in the sense that they face no meaningful
discipline from above for, say, results-oriented rulings that suit their
personal preferences or enhance their power. By contrast, the hierar-
chy of an administrative court system is likely to discourage results-
oriented judging, because the prestige and legitimacy of the adminis-
trative judiciary is tied to its reputation as part of a neutral,
apolitical civil service.39 Of course, for the court at the apex of the
administrative hierarchy, any such restraint must be self-imposed,
and is therefore likely to be weaker.40
Together, these system-level features affect the principal's capac-
ity to rely on both the agent and the monitor. The degree to which
these players have the type of autonomy we identify as most rele-
vant-horizontal autonomy in the case of the agency, and vertical
autonomy in the case of the court-will influence the strategy the
legislature chooses, which in turn bears on the choices of these other
actors. Simplifying, we could imagine that constitutional differences
across jurisdictions produce agents of two types: "high-autonomy"
agents (where the principal has little effective control over the
agency) and "low-autonomy" agents (where the principal has sub-
stantial control). Similarly, we can describe two ideal types of courts:
"high-autonomy" and "low-autonomy" courts. Putting this all to-
gether, there are four possible cases as summarized by Table 1:
38. David S. Law, How to Rig the Federal Courts, 99 GEO. L.J. 779, 795-803 (2011)
(describing judicial control over promotion in Japan).
39. On the self-conception of the civil service in France, see EZRA N. SULEIMAN,
POLITICS, POWER, AND BUREAUCRACY IN FRANCE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 13-24
(1974). On the concept of individual vs. collective (branch) reputation in general as
well as in the context of France, see Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 14.
40. Also, to the extent that administrative decisions are subject to review in con-
stitutional courts, this logic of restraint does not apply to those courts-but
constitutional review falls outside the purview of this paper.
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TABLE 1: TYPES OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Agencies
LOW AUTONOMY HIGH AUTONOM
Contributing factors: Contributing factors:
" Parliamentary system * Presidential system
* Unitary government * Federal government
" Few parties * Many parties
OWi ftors:I low-autonomy high-autonomy
Contributing factors: agencies, agencies,* Career judiciary agnisaece,
* Specialized courts low-autonomy courts low-autonomy courts
Courts
HIGH AUTONOM low-autonomy high-autonomy
Contributing factors: agencies, agencies,
" Recognition judiciary high-autonomy high-autonomy
" Generalist courts courts courts
IV. EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
To recap, the object of our investigation is the sequence of choices
made by three institutional actors: a legislature, an agency, and a
court. The legislature acts first, making both a system-level decision
on whether the scope of administrative review will be broad or nar-
row, and a statute-specific decision about whether to make a broad or
narrow delegation of power to an agency. Second, the agency decides
how to implement the statute, either playing it safe, by choosing a
conservative interpretation of the statute to minimize chances of ju-
dicial reversal, or taking a bolder course, pushing the borders of what
the statute permits on a hard-to-verify claim of "expertise."41 Lastly,
the court will decide whether to uphold the agency or reject it.
In game theory terms, we have the elements of an extensive-form
game (that is, a game in which players make moves sequentially,
rather than simultaneously; the latter being called a standard-form
game, such as the popular "Prisoner's Dilemma").42 We do not under-
take a formal game-theoretic analysis (although we do include in the
Appendix a game tree that maps out the sequence of moves available
to the players). Even so, thinking about the institutions' choices in
game theory terms is illustrative, because it helps us see which
41. Again, the agency's assertion of expertise may be genuine, and promote the
principal's goals efficiently, or it may be a smokescreen for the agency to promote its
own agenda.
42. Specifically, an extensive form game consists of a set of players, the order in
which they move, the choices they have when they move, the payoffs they receive from
their moves, and the knowledge the players have, about other players and payoffs. See
DREw FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 77 (1991). Notice that one other
element of some games, the probability distribution over exogenous events, is not rel-
evant to this game. We have defined the first three elements of the game above, and
below will further discuss players' payoffs, which we assume are open knowledge to
all players.
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choices for each institution would yield the best outcomes, given the
other institutions' choices.
Game theorists solve a problem like this by asking what strate-
gies from the players would lead to an equilibrium outcome in which
no player could improve his payoff by making different choices, given
the choices the other players made. The method for determining what
those strategies are is called backwards induction. Backward induc-
tion starts by considering the last move in the game, and asks which
choice would yield the best outcome for the player making the move,
for each possible combination of choices made by players earlier in
the game. Next, it proceeds up one move, and asks what would be the
best choice for the player who has that move, given what we know
about how the player who has the last move would likely act. The
process continues up the sequence of moves in this way, until we have
determined all the best strategy for all of the players for the whole of
the game.
What follows is an informal backwards induction analysis of the
four different configurations identified in Table 1. The purpose of this
exercise is to show how different institutional features lead to differ-
ent optimal choices with respect to delegation, discretion, and
deference. The first time through, we work through the whole se-
quence of moves, and for the subsequent iterations, focus on the areas
where differences in how the institutions are configured favor differ-
ent choices.
After explaining our expectations for the strategies chosen under
each configuration, we then illustrate the points with reference to the
administrative law of a representative legal system. The cases we
consider-Germany, France, the Commonwealth systems of Britain,
Canada, and Australia (discussed together), and the United States-
were selected both because in our view they collectively represent all
of the four types listed in Table 1, and also because they are accessi-
ble to English-language readers, in that each is already the subject of
a substantial body of scholarship in English.
Before proceeding, some caveats are in order. The discussions be-
low are in no way offered as proof of the correctness of our model.
Such a small number of cases provide no firm basis for drawing con-
clusions about the validity of our account. And while our
characterizations of different systems are based on our evaluation of
the relevant doctrine and scholarship, cross-national comparisons on
matters such as the extent of legislative delegations necessarily con-
tain a subjective element.
Moreover, one outcome variable about which the model makes
some predictions-how agencies exercise the discretion they are
granted-is particularly resistant to meaningful and systematic mea-
surement. Well-informed observers will disagree about whether a
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given agency action used discretion in good faith, and objective mea-
sures are lacking. As a result, we largely omit discussion of it below,
except to note that the prominence of the topic of agency defection
from legislative policy objectives in the administrative law scholar-
ship of a country may serve as a rough proxy for how significant a
problem national experts perceive it to be.
Lastly, our model necessarily excludes from consideration many
factors that may bear on national differences in administration, and
we do not pretend otherwise. For all of these reasons, the case studies
should be regarded as illustrative sketches that serve to demonstrate
the model's plausibility as an explanatory account. We leave it to the
readers to judge whether the account is convincing.
One last limitation of our model is that it is static, in the sense
that it does not account for changes within systems over time, al-
though of course, administrative systems do evolve. 43 But we present
it as a reasonable first-cut theory for explaining some major, ob-
served variations. It must be left for future projects to consider how
changes currently underway in some of the systems under review,
including a broader embrace of institutionally-distinct independent
regulators, will change the institutional equilibrium.
A. Low-Autonomy Agencies and Low-Autonomy Courts
We start with a low-autonomy agency and a low-autonomy court.
A low-autonomy court is, all else equal, a more reliable monitor of
agency performance than a high-autonomy court: the court faces real
costs for defecting from its responsibility, either by privileging its
own policy preferences or shirking its responsibility to carry out a
meaningful review.
If such a court is granted a broad scope of review, when the
agency is operating under a narrow delegation of power, we can ex-
pect the court to uphold agency action when the agency plays it safe
and reverse when the agency exceeds the scope of its mandate by ap-
plying expertise. If such a court is granted a broad scope of review
and the agency is operating under a broad delegation of power, we
expect the court to uphold the agency when it's playing it safe, and
when it's applying expertise, either to uphold or reverse the agency,
based the court's best judgment as to whether the application of ex-
pertise is valid.
43. For a recent piece thoroughly considering some recent changes in French pub-
lic law, see Susan Rose-Ackerman & Thomas Perroud, Policymaking and Public Law
in France: Public Participation, Agency Independence, and Impact Assessment, 19
COLUM. J. EURO. L. 225 (2013). The discussion below does not delve into how the
effective degree of government concentration will vary over time in non-parliamen-
tary systems, because control of the legislative and executive branches will sometimes
by divided among parties, and sometimes shared.
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If, on the other hand, the court is granted a narrow scope of re-
view only, the court will be effectively shut out from reviewing how
the agency exercises its discretion when it operates pursuant to a
broad delegation of power. (We would not expect a low-autonomy
court to try to circumvent the limits on its own scope of review, in
order to effectively arrogate to itself the power of merits review.)
When the agency's delegation is narrow, the court will uphold when
the agency plays it safe, and reverse when the agency applies exper-
tise in contravention of the limits of its delegation.
Consider now the behavior of the low-autonomy agency. If
granted a broad delegation of power, the agency will predictably ap-
ply expertise in furtherance of the principal's interests. If the agency
is delegated a narrow grant of power, it will presumably play it safe:
both because it seeks to implement the legislature's preferences, and
also because it would anticipate judicial reversal if it were to behave
otherwise.
The legislature must decide how broadly to delegate authority to
agencies, and how much authority to give to the courts against the
backdrop of the anticipated strategies of these institutions. We would
expect broad delegations to agencies to be common in systems with
low-autonomy agencies and low-autonomy courts: legislatures can
delegate broadly in order to reap the benefits of agency expertise
without worrying much about agencies misusing their discretion in
ways beyond the legislature's power to correct. When courts have to
worry less about agency misbehavior, vigorous monitoring is less es-
sential-and could in fact be detrimental, if courts are unskilled at
evaluating whether agencies are deploying discretion in ways that
further the statutory schemes. So we would expect judicial review to
be confined to serving the more limited purpose of protecting individ-
ual rights implicated by administrative action, rather than policing
agency policy choices more generally.
Profile: Low-autonomy agencies, low-autonomy courts
Prediction: Broad delegation; narrow scope for judicial review;
application of expertise by agencies; judicial review
plays marginal role
Example: Germany
In many respects, Germany fits the model of a legal system with
low-autonomy administration and low-autonomy courts. Germany is
a parliamentary democracy; the party or coalition that controls the
legislature also controls the executive. 44 Accordingly, the government
44. Seats in the popularly-elected Bundestag are assigned on the basis of propor-
tional representation, but no seats are given to seats that fail to meet a "5% hurdle,"
which discourages the proliferation of small parties.
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in power appoints the leaders of the national ministries. 45 For most
of the postwar period, two major parties have captured the lion's
share of the seats in the parliament, although in recent years smaller
parties have increased their shares.
As a federal republic, Germany diverges from the ideal type iden-
tified in Table 1, and federalism does indeed shape how statutes are
both written and administered. Under the Basic Law, Germany's con-
stitution, legislation on certain subjects must be approved not only by
the Bundestag, which is the popularly-elected national assembly, but
also by the Bundesrat (Federal Council), which represents the inter-
ests of the sixteen Lander.46  Moreover, responsibility for
implementing legislation is shared between administrations at the
national level and the administrations of the Ldnder. And although
the national government plays "a predominant role regarding legisla-
tion," "the main responsibility regarding administrative matters lies
with the Ldinder."47
Nonetheless, federalism expands the autonomy of administrators
at the Land level only to a limited extent. First, the national minis-
tries have the constitutional authority to issue administrative rules
that confine the discretion of lower-level administrators, 48 and they
make extensive use of it. 4 9 Second, owing to their central role in ad-
ministration, Lander are consulted during the legislative process, so
that their own positions are reflected in the legislation they are
tasked with implementing. 50 In certain policy areas, the role of the
Ldnder is institutionalized in Bund-Ldnder "Work Circles," consulta-
tive bodies of federal and Land officials, which "exert a strong
influence on the content of both laws and regulations." 51
Similar consultative processes also function to solicit political in-
put on the content of regulations precisely when matters have high
45. Germany also has established a modest number of independent agencies, such
as the German Central Bank (Deutsches Bundesbank), the Federal Competition
Agency (Bundeskartellamt), and the Federal Network Agency for Telecommunica-
tions, Gas, Electricity, Mail, and Railroads (RegTP). These have higher autonomy
than the ministries, and are also less subject to the strictures of general administra-
tive law.
46. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (GG), Art. 73 (Ger.).
The Bundesrat also has a limited power to veto legislation more generally. GG Art. 77
(3)-(4) (Ger.).
47. INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAw 86 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin
eds., 1996). The role of the Lander in the administration of statutes was simplified
and streamlined in 2006 constitutional reforms. See Simone Burkhart, Reforming
Federalism in Germany: Incremental Changes Instead of the Big Deal, 39 PUBLIUS:
THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 341 (2009).
48. GG Art. 84 sec. 2 (Ger.).
49. See CHRISTIAN HEITSCH, DIE AUSFGHRUNG DER BUNDESGESETZE DURCH DIE
LANDER 228-33 (2001) (detailing multiple types of administrative rules that minis-
tries issue).
50. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIM-
ITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 66 (1995).
51. Id. at 67.
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political salience, tightening the link between elected officials and the
administration. While the administration has "significant latitude in
developing policies" in matters of low political salience, there is an
understanding that "significant political issues cannot be settled
within the routine bureaucratic regulatory process, or even by seek-
ing to get ministers onside."5 2 Rather, bureaucrats structure the
process such that contentious issues are kicked upstairs to be explic-
itly hammered out at the political level before regulators proceed
with their work.5 3
Judicial review of administrative actions in Germany takes place
within specialized administrative courts with a low degree of vertical
autonomy. Organizationally, Germany's administrative courts belong
to the judicial branch and not the administration, as in France, 54 and
the independence of the judiciary from the other branches of govern-
ment is guaranteed by the Basic Law. 55 Internally, however, the
administrative judiciary is sharply hierarchical, professionalized,
and bureaucratized. Judicial appointment practices vary by Land,
but generally, the recommendations of sitting judges are critical to
appointment. 56 Judges are dependent on the assessments of senior
judges for their advancement, and may be disciplined, among other
reasons, for "the contents or merits" of their work.57 In other words,
individual administrative judges in Germany have strong incentives
to conform their rulings to the institutional standards set within the
administrative hierarchy.
Our model would predict broad delegations, faithful applications
of expertise by agencies, and a marginal role for judicial review.
When we look to the German administrative law system in practice,
what we see appears consistent with these predictions. German stat-
utes frequently contain broad delegations of power to the ministries
that implement them.58 To take one example, Germany's most impor-
tant piece of air quality legislation, the Federal Pollution Control Act
(Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz), identifies broad objectives that
emissions controls should serve, but leaves it to the administration to
provide the real policy content. 59 Also, in sharp contrast to the
52. EDWARD C. PAGE, POLICY WITHOUT POLITICIANS: BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 68 (2012).
53. Id. at 68, 76-78, 83.
54. See infra Part IV.B.
55. GG Art 101(1) (Ger.). See also MAHENDRA SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE 190 (2010).
56. MAHENDRA SINGH, supra note 55, at 193.
57. Id. at 195.
58. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 50, at 57 (noting the lack of specificity of many
statutes).
59. BUNDES-IMMISSIONSSCHUTZGESETZ, BGB1.I, p. 721; See also Monika T. Neu-
mann, The Environmental Law System of the Federal Republic of Germany, 3 ANN.
SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 69, 87-89 (1996). On some occasions, the Bundestag will sub-
sequently amend a broadly-written law, adding more specificity in light of the
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rulemaking regime set up by the American Administrative Procedure
Act, Germany's analogue, the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, leaves
the administration almost complete discretion over the procedures it
is to follow in formulating regulations.60 Of course, there is no easy
way to assess whether administrators take advantage of the broad
delegations of power to implement legislation at odds with the policy
goals of the legislature. But this we can say: if administrative abuse
of policymaking discretion were perceived as a significant problem in
Germany, we would expect it to be a major topic of discussion in the
German administrative law scholarship, and it is not.
We also predict that judicial review plays a limited role in Ger-
man administrative law, in large part because the legislature has
effective means for controlling administrative behavior without
resorting to judicial review. The focus of administrative review, as
enshrined in Germany's Administrative Procedure Act, is squarely on
the protection of individual rights, rather than oversight of policy-
relevant discretion.6 1 In comparative terms,6 2 "unlike the French
Conseil d'Etat, the present German administrative courts are not
considered primarily a super watchman over the activities of the ad-
ministration to keep it within the law. They are primarily the
protectors and defenders of the rights of an individual against the
administrative excesses. '63 Administrative law doctrine accords to
administrators a "margin of appraisal" (Beurteilungspielraum) in de-
termining how legal concepts apply in some concrete situations,64
and broader, policy-relevant determinations-setting permissible ex-
posure levels for specific pollutants, for instance-often escape
review altogether.65
B. High-Autonomy Agencies and Low-Autonomy Courts
Consider now the expected equilibrium with high-autonomy
agencies and low-autonomy courts. This is a situation in which courts
can provide a valuable service as monitors.
administration's experience in implementing the law. See id. at 91-93 (describing the
evolution of Germany's legal regime for protecting water quality).
60. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 50, at 60.
61. See VERWALTUNGSVERFAHRENSGESETZ, Art. 40 (Ger.) (granting administrators
authority to exercise discretion consistent with the law; See also MVARINA KONNECKE,
TRADITION AND CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: AN ANGLO-GERMAN COMPARISON 78
(2010) (noting sharp limits on judicial review on exercises of discretion).
62. For more discussion of judicial review in France, see infra Part IV.B.
63. SINGH, supra note 55, at 191.
64. See Arai-Takahashi, supra note 22, at 75-80 (discussing the doctrine). Inter-
estingly, on occasions when it has reviewed administrative law issues, Germany's
Constitutional Court--which sits at the apex of the judicial system and thus enjoys
high vertical and horizontal autonomy-has been substantially less deferential to dis-
cretionary decisions.
65. See ROsE-ACKERMAN, supra note 50, at 60.
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The strategies courts would choose in each of the various situa-
tions they might confront (or more technically, the different nodes of
the game tree) are the same as in the above discussion, because the
courts are of the same type.
The agency's strategies, however, may differ. If there is a broad
delegation of power and broad scope of review, the agency's choice
between playing it safe and applying expertise will depend on its
preferences (achieving policy ends versus avoiding reversal)-assum-
ing judicial competence at distinguishing valid from invalid
applications of expertise. With effective judicial review in place, the
agency cannot use the application of expertise as a smokescreen to
promote its own policy interests. So long as the agency's own inter-
ests are not better served by playing it safe, we should expect to see
agencies applying expertise, and doing so in a way faithful to the
statute's goals.
However, if the scope of judicial review is narrow, a broad delega-
tion of power to the agency effectively licenses it to pursue its own
policy interests under cover of applying expertise. On the other hand,
if the delegation to the agency is narrow, the agency will predictably
play it safe, knowing that the court would otherwise reverse it.
The legislature's choice between narrow and broad delegations
will ultimately come down to how highly it values expertise, how reli-
able the agencies are, and to its capacity for writing detailed statutes.
Generally speaking, in this state of affairs, judicial review can pro-
vide safeguards against the abuse of expertise, and make it worth a
legislature's while to draft statutes to give agencies some running
room. But the quality of judicial review-here assumed-is key: if
courts are not adept at distinguishing between valid and invalid ap-
plications of expertise, the results will be less salutary, as discussed
below. 66
Profile: High autonomy agencies, low-autonomy courts
Prediction: broad delegation; broad scope for judicial review;
application of expertise by agencies; judicial review
plays important role
Example: France
The Constitution of France's Fifth Republic, adopted in 1958, es-
tablishes a semi-presidential political system, in which the President,
who heads the executive branch, is elected independently of the par-
liament. 67 When the President and the parliamentary majority come
from the same party, the dynamics of governing roughly approximate
66. Infra Part IV.C.
67. LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958 Oct. 4, 1958, art. 6-8, 24 (Fr.).
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those of a parliamentary democracy. But the situation is different
under "cohabitation," when the president's party does not hold a ma-
jority in the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament.
Under cohabitation, the President must appoint a prime minister ac-
ceptable to the National Assembly, which means in effect, a prime
minister from the party holding the parliamentary majority.68 Thus,
at least during periods of cohabitation, the concentration of power in
France is reduced,69 and the government is less reliably able to exert
direct control over the ministries. 70
Of course, the claim that the French administration enjoys high
autonomy, especially during cohabitation, must be understood as
both a generalization and a relative claim. As a recent study shows,
political leaders are sometimes involved in the drafting of regulations
in France. 71 Notably, however, the impetus for regulation more often
comes from within the administration, arising from bureaucrats' in-
teractions with interest groups, with politicians remaining "relatively
silent" through the process. 72
Like Germany, France has in recent years established some in-
dependent agencies,7 3 but most statutes are still implemented by the
administration. The administration itself has high autonomy: it is
vested with substantial powers and subject to inconsistent oversight
by the political branches. "It is an outstanding characteristic of mod-
ern French administration," in the words of a leading British
authority on the subject, "that discretion should be given to officials
rather than politicians."74 And although the stability of governments
since 1958 may have strengthened political influence over adminis-
tration, "parliamentary control through effective ministerial
accountability and workable specialist committees remains to be
achieved."75
Although judicial review in France differs in important respects
from Germany, France shares with Germany an administrative judi-
ciary with low vertical autonomy. Administrative courts in France
68. L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (1998).
69. See MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEM-
BLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 60-61 (1992).
70. A further source of division in the French constitutional order is that the Con-
stitution distinguishes between a pouvoir rdglementaire of the government and a
pouvoir lgislatif of parliament, and accords to the executive "sweeping powers to reg-
ulate by degree." BROWN & BELL, supra note 68.
71. PAGE, supra note 52, at 42-44.
72. Id. at 43.
73. For an exhaustive treatment, see CONSEIL D'ETAT, RAPPORT PUBLIC 2001 : Ju-
RISPRUDENCE ET AVIs DE 2000. LES AUTORITtS ADMINISTRATIVES INDIEPENDANTES.
74. BROWN & BELL, supra note 68, at 26.
75. Id. at 27. See also FREDERICK F. RIDLEY & JEAN BLONDEL, PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-
TION IN FRANCE (1969).
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are themselves a part of the administration, not the judicial branch.7 6
The administrative courts have significant independence from the po-
litical branches, but internally, they are hierarchical, bureaucratized,
and professionalized. No political involvement is permitted in the se-
lection or promotion of judges, whose careers instead are governed by
meritocratic and seniority-rewarding rules. 77 Collegial decision-mak-
ing and the secrecy of decisions also ensure that judges know to be
responsive to the internal norms of their profession, rather than the
wishes of outside political actors.78
In such a system, we would expect to see broad delegations from
the legislature, and broad latitude on the part of courts to review ad-
ministrative decisions, in order to keep the administration in line.
Article 38 of the 1958 French constitution permits an open-ended del-
egation of legislative authority to the administration (subject to the
possibility of a legislative countermand),7 9 and the delegations from
the Parliament leave substantial latitude to the administration.80
Also, French administrative law equips administrative courts
with powerful tools to keep the administration in line. The French
administrative judge, "as compared to its counterparts elsewhere in
Europe... has perhaps some of the broadest range of powers." ' Sub-
stantively, French administrative judges have broad-ranging powers
of review, and an unusually wide array of remedial powers, including
powers to impose damages and to annul administrative actions.8 2 In
the words of one authority,
The administrative judge in France not only has authority to
hear actions for damages.., but also actions seeking annul-
ment of administrative acts as ultra vires, something that in
other European countries is often limited to certain catego-
ries of acts, whether to those of an exclusively individual or
76. "In house" judicial review of administration dates back to Napoleonic days,
and is the source for Henrion de Pansey's famous observation that to judge the admin-
istration is itself administration ("Juger l'administration, c'est encore administrer").
HENRION DE PANSEY, DE L'AUTORIT9 JUDICIAIRE EN FRANCE (1818). For more on the
historical background, see Bignami, supra note 1, at 4-6.
77. Jean Massot, Powers and Duties of the French Administrative Judge, in COM-
PARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 415, 415-16 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth
eds., 2010).
78. Id. at 416.
79. BOGDAN IANCU, LEGIsLATIVE DELEGATION: THE EROSION OF NORMATIVE LIMITS
IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM 254-55 (2012).
80. Rose-Ackerman & Perroud, supra note 43, at 228 (describing the ideal of
French administration as that "[s]tatutes should set out broad frameworks, but their
concrete implementation should be left to impartial, expert bureaucrats committed to
republican values.").
81. Massot, supra note 77, at 417.
82. Id.; DIDIER TRUCHET, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 136-38 (2008).
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an exclusively regulatory character depending on the
system.8 3
As Neville Brown and John Bell argue, these broad judicial pow-
ers serve as a counterweight to the broad powers given to
administrators.8 4 We add that what makes this compromise accept-
able to the Parliament is the reliability of the administrative courts.
C. Low-Autonomy Agencies and High-Autonomy Courts
What situation results when we have a low-autonomy agency
and a high-autonomy court? From a principal-agent perspective, this
is a situation where the presence of judicial review with a broad scope
degrades the quality of policy. In the absence of judicial review, the
legislature would delegate broadly, and the agency would apply un-
verifiable expertise. If the court possessed a broad scope of review, it
could use it as a pretext for substituting its own policy judgments for
the agency's. It makes sense, then, for the legislature to restrict the
scope of judicial review. But courts themselves will push the bounda-
ries of their limited scope of review. This is generally consistent with
administrative law in Britain, Canada and Australia.8 5
What is interesting in this respect, and not surprising, is that
courts can seek to expand the scope of their effective review by ag-
gressively interpreting their grants of authority from the legislature.
And, as discussed below, we do see evidence of this phenomenon.
Profile: High autonomy courts, low-autonomy agencies
Prediction: Broad delegation; narrow scope for judicial review;
application of expertise by agencies; courts push to
expand role of judicial review
Example: British Commonwealth
Three Commonwealth countries, Australia, Great Britain, and
Canada, illustrate the dynamics in systems with low-autonomy agen-
cies and high-autonomy courts. Although these three systems differ
in many important respects, their common legal background means
that they share a number of features that are relevant to our pur-
poses.86 All are parliamentary democracies with a common law
83. Id. at 417.
84. BROWN & BELL, supra note 68, at 27 ("In essence, administration by bureau-
crats is made more palatable because, through the administrative courts, the
bureaucrats have established their own control and supervisory machinery.").
85. S. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 93-376, 379-583
(4th ed. 1980); H. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 213-409, 319-409 (5th ed. 1982); S.
HOTOP, PRINCIPLES OF AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 327-54 (6th ed. 1985); John
Willis, Canadian Administrative Law, 6 J.S.P.T.L. 53 (1961).
86. In a similar vein, Stephen Gardbaum has recently argued that the Common-
wealth countries together define a new model of constitutionalism, notwithstanding
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heritage, and as such, each combines a low degree of agency auton-
omy with a high degree of judicial autonomy.
As discussed above,8 7 parliamentary democracy concentrates
control of the executive and legislative branch in the same party or
coalition, lowering the barriers to legislative control over administra-
tion. In each of the three countries, the government in power
appoints the heads of ministries; in each, the number of national po-
litical parties is small, and having a single party in power is the
norm. However, Australia and Canada are both federal regimes,
which dilutes the concentration of government power to some extent.
Also, in recent decades, Australia, Britain, and Canada have all ex-
perimented with independent or quasi-governmental agencies, which
have a more attenuated relationship to political control, but these
have by no means displaced the traditional organization of adminis-
tration into ministries.
As common law systems, they share in a tradition where admin-
istrative action is reviewed by ordinary courts, as opposed to
specialized administrative jurisdictions. And the ordinary judiciary
has a high degree of independence, in the sense of both vertical and
horizontal autonomy. This tradition, too, has come under pressure in
recent decades, and in all of these systems, administrative actions
are also subject to review by specialized administrative tribunals, al-
beit to varying extents.88 Still, ordinary courts continue to play an
important role in administrative law.
As expected, in the Commonwealth systems, we see substantial
delegations of power to administrative agencies, in order to take ad-
vantage of administrators' expertise. All of these systems have
sought to constrain the scope of judicial review by the ordinary
courts, to keep those courts from substituting their own judgment for
that of administrators. Interestingly, the ordinary courts have in
many instances fought back, pushing against the efforts to limit the
scope of review.
For instance, in Britain, the ordinary courts chafed at legislative
efforts to limit the scope of their review. The Anisminic doctrine illus-
trates the dynamic at work. The Foreign Compensation Act of 1950
ostensibly placed decisions on compensation claims made by an ad-
ministrative tribunal beyond the scope of judicial review. The House
of Lords, however, declared that the ouster clause did not prevent the
courts from declaring that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because it
misconstrued the organic statute.8 9 Anisminic in effect converts all
their differences. See STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CON-
STITUTIONAL1SM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 89-94.
89. Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission, [19681 2 AC 147 (H.L.)
(Appeal taken from Eng.).
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errors of law into jurisdictional errors, and hence vaporized the limit
on judicial review. The Anisminic decision was one of the "assertive
steps that made [the courts] the conclusive arbiters on all questions
of law." 90 Likewise, through the doctrine of "jurisdictional facts,"
courts in Australia have arrogated to themselves authority to make
conclusive, de novo determinations on any facts that bear on whether
the agency properly has power to act.91
Nor are Commonwealth judiciaries inclined to show great defer-
ence to administrators on questions of law. The Supreme Court of
Canada initially struck a deferential tone in Canadian Union of Pub-
lic Employees Local 963 (CUPE) (1979), declaring that the Court
should only overturn patently unreasonable interpretations of stat-
utes. But the Supreme Court diminished its deference in the late
1980s and early 1990s. 92 Australia's Supreme Court has also rejected
the American-style Chevron approach as too deferential, preferring
instead an approach that "favors wider judicial control over adminis-
trative action."93 It is important not to overstate the point:
Australian courts have respected some of the limits on their review of
administrative action. 94 But the general pattern is one in which
courts push against the legislatively-imposed constraints on their re-
view of agencies.
D. High-Autonomy Agencies and High-Autonomy Courts
The last configuration is a high-autonomy agency and a high-au-
tonomy court. What strategies of delegation, discretion, and
deference will the players choose?
Starting again with the courts, if the legislature delegates
broadly and the agency plays it safe, a court will generally uphold
what the agency does-but the very breadth of the delegation may
mean that there is no fully "safe" move for the agency, opening the
possibility of some reversals, particularly if the courts disapprove of
the agency's policy outcome. If the agency applies expertise pursuant
to a broad delegation, highly autonomous courts thus have wide lati-
tude either to uphold or to reverse. We can expect courts to take
90. Michael C. Tolley, Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation of Statutes: Defer-
ence Doctrines in Comparative Perspective, 31 POLICY STUD. J. 421, 426 (2003).
91. Id. at 427.
92. The key cases are: Union des Employes de Service, Local 298 v. Bibeault,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048 (Can.) and Canada v. Public Service Alliance of Canada [1991] 3
S.C.R. 572 (Can.) (Supreme Court tightens up on deference). Court first determines
de novo whether agencies exceeded jurisdiction, must then determine (de novo)
whether interpretative matter is itself jurisdictional, and only if it's not, court applies
reasonableness test: but reasonableness simpliciter, not patently unreasonable.
93. Tolley, supra note 90, at 427.
94. For instance, the Australian courts have generally declined to contest their
exclusion of review of what we would call legislative rules. See W. B. LANE & SIMON
YOUNG, ADMINSTRATIVE LAw IN AUSTRALIA 74 (2007).
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advantage of this latitude, to uphold the agency action some of the
time, and reverse it some of the time-whether from suspicion that
the agency is claiming "expertise" as a pretext for pursuing its own
policy preferences, or as a pretext for pursuing the court's own policy
preferences. Now consider what happens if the legislature delegates
narrowly to the agency. If the agency plays it safe, we can expect that
the court generally will uphold the agency's action-failing to do so
exposes it as unfaithful to the statute-although, since the court's
autonomy shields it from meaningful censure, it may still reverse the
agency's "safe" decision on occasion. Conversely, if the agency applies
unverifiable expertise when the statute seems to foreclose this, the
court will probably reverse the agency, but may on occasion be em-
boldened to uphold the agency if the court likes the policy outcome.
The net effect is that the outcomes of judicial review are hard to pre-
dict, though both legislatures and agencies can take actions to
diminish the probability of reversal.
What will the agency do? In effect, the agency faces a deference
lottery. In terms of the model, the agency's best response may be a
"mixed strategy," in which the agency plays it safe some of the time,
and applies expertise some of the time. In the real world, the agency
may be able to choose a policy that lies between these extremes. The
particulars of the agency's choice will depend on the particular node
where it finds itself and its preferences (including how much it wants
to avoid reversal and the extent to which its policy preferences are at
odds with the legislature's). But generally, the unpredictability of ju-
dicial review will encourage the agency to play it safe more than they
otherwise might, in order to provide some insulation against
reversals.
The legislature, in turn, could choose a narrow delegation (that
is, high statutory specificity), which would generally induce faithful
implementation by the agency and favorable review by the court, but
this comes at a cost: it deprives the policy of the benefit of agency
expertise, and it uses a lot of legislative capacity (at least in a system
with separation of powers) to draft detailed statutes. The legislature
could also delegate broadly, but restrict the scope of review. The cost
would be that it would diminish or even eliminate monitoring, and in
the circumstance when it is most needed (when there's a broad dele-
gation of power). The legislature's best bet is to adopt a mixed
strategy of its own: granting a wide scope of review to permit some
effective monitoring, and alternating between delegating narrowly
and broadly consistent with its capacity.
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Profile: High autonomy courts, high-autonomy agencies
Prediction: Mixed strategies: broad and narrow delegations;
agencies sometimes apply expertise, and sometimes
play safe; courts sometimes review aggressively,
sometimes defer to agency
Example: United States
These features generally describe what we see in the United
States, a system with both highly autonomous agencies and highly
autonomous reviewing courts. The separation of powers system,
under which agencies are instrumentalities of the executive branch
and report to the President, leaves Congress with few tools to prevent
ex post defections by agencies implementing congressional statutes.
And the profusion of "veto players"95 in the U.S. bicameral legislative
system, in which bills must satisfy not only two houses of Congress,
but also powerful committee "gatekeepers," and a President vested
with veto power, sharply limits Congress's capacity to control agen-
cies ex ante by providing minutely-detailed delegations of power. 96
Both of these factors contribute to agencies' effective autonomy from
Congress.
Review of American administrative agencies is confided to the
ordinary federal courts. Federal judges, of course, have life tenure
under the U.S. Constitution.97 And although federal courts are vul-
nerable to having their rulings reversed by courts higher in the
judicial hierarchy, judges do not depend for job security or their pro-
fessional advancement on their superiors' satisfaction with their
rulings.
Faced with a limited capacity to control agencies, Congress takes
a mixed approach, delegating broadly in some instances, and specify-
ing agency details in minute detail in other statutes.98 For instance:
Congress maintains tight control over the imposition of federal taxes
by maintaining an exhaustively detailed federal tax code, but gives
only the broadest guidelines to the agencies charged with ensuring
workplace health and safety.99 Of course, a number of factors bear on
which policy areas Congress maintains a tight control over, includ-
ing, possibly, the political salience and importance of the subject, and
the importance of flexibility in response to changing circumstances.
Our point is that Congress's limited capacity means it cannot always
specify in detail how agencies should perform, even when it might
95. See generally TSEBELIS, supra note 27.
96. See also KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS (1998) (explaining more generally
how the structures of the American legislative process restrict Congress's capacity to
change the status quo legislatively).
97. U.S. CONST. Art. III sec.1.
98. HUBER & SHIPAN, supra note 7.
99. Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
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wish to, and that Congress instead does what it can, investing in ex
ante controls in a selection of areas.
The U.S. administrative law system assigns a prominent role to
courts and judicial review. The basic framework of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act of 1946 grants federal courts extensive powers of
review, including the authority to decide all questions of law relevant
to agency decision-making. 10 0 And in practice, judicial review of
agencies in the United States resembles a mixed strategy. Courts de-
fer to agency decisions some, but not all, of the time. Indeed, as one of
us has shown, in the context of agency constructions of federal law,
the judicial approach is almost impossible to predict.' 0 ' In previous
work, one of us has emphasized how doctrinal uncertainty can con-
tribute to judicial inconsistency in deference decisions. 10 2 Yet from a
strategic point of view, deference lottery serves two ends: it both pro-
vides political cover for decisions motivated by policy preferences,
and it also is less costly than applying a high level of scrutiny across
the board.
As noted above, it is difficult to develop system-wide characteri-
zations of how agencies exercise discretion, but what we do know
suggests a highly variegated picture, where agencies play it safe
some of the time and at other times apply unverifiable expertise,
sometimes in the service of policy agendas at odds with the statutory
mandates they are tasked to serve1r0
V. CONCLUSIONS
Comparative administrative law has identified important varia-
tions in the way regulatory agencies comply with statutes and courts
deal with administrative disputes across jurisdictions. One of the
most common explanations relies on legal culture, tradition or ideol-
ogy. The loose distinction between common law and civil law (in the
sense of legal culture and institutional design) is used to identify im-
portant variations. However, such explanations cannot provide for
more detailed and subtle differences with the same legal family.
Economic and social realities are also considered to matter, at
least, in the way they generate different challenges to regulatory
agencies and courts. For example, Table Two shows important differ-
ences concerning government spending and intensity of regulation (a
possible measure of government intervention in the economy) that
inevitably generate a distinct context for administrative procedure
and litigation. Clearly the role of administrative law responds to par-
ticular needs and there are significant variations in these needs, as
100. APA § 706.
101. Mathews, supra note 9.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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documented by Table Two. Overall, these various arrangements re-
flect varying social preferences. 10 4
TABLE 2
Product Market
Government Regulation
Spending as % of Indicator' 0 5
GDP (2009, OECD) (2008, OECD)
United States 43% 0.84
United Kingdom 51% 0.79
Australia 37% 1.23
Canada 44% 0.96
Germany 48% 1.27
France 57% 1.39
Our article suggests a systematic explanation for the behavior of
regulatory agencies and courts based on a political economy theory.
The apparently different patterns of regulatory delegation and court
reaction respond to similar decisions, notwithstanding varying
payoffs. These variations on expected payoffs are conditioned by legal
tradition and economic realities as well as by political and constitu-
tional arrangements. We show that they form different bundles of
institutional factors that change in significant ways the expected
payoffs of governments (principal), regulatory agencies (agent), and
courts (monitor). As a consequence, faced with an identical set of pos-
sible strategies, the relevant actors choose different responses as a
function of the varying bundles of institutional factors. In our model,
different patterns of regulatory behavior and court deference emerge
as rational responses to identical problems conditioned on exogenous
parameters.
The conventional explanations are captured in our approach by
the distinction between low-autonomy and high-autonomy courts.
However, as we note, this distinction does not capture the nuances
across jurisdictions within similar legal families. A political economy
104. See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120
HARv. L. REV. 460 (2006) (arguing that social democracy, rather legal origin, explains
differences across jurisdictions in relation to designing corporate law).
105. According to the OECD, this integrated indicator measures "the extent to
which policy settings promote or inhibit competition in areas of the product market
where competition is viable." See http://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/indicatorsofpro
ductmarketregulationhomepage.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). By measuring one
type of state intervention in the economy, it partially explains the potential demand
for administrative law (i.e., a less regulated economy begs for less administrative
law).
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model based only on low versus high-autonomy courts fails to address
essential features of regulatory behavior and court performance.
Our approach considers a second dimension, i.e., low-autonomy
and high-autonomy agencies. By coupling the court dimension with
the variation in agencies, our model can explain differences within
legal families in a way that previous political economy models could
not.
The political economy model developed in this article proposes
four possible equilibrium arrangements that capture four models: low
autonomy of both agencies and courts (Germany), high autonomy of
both agencies and courts (United States), low autonomy of agencies
with high autonomy of courts (United Kingdom and Commonwealth
jurisdictions), and vice-versa (France). Broader or more limited dele-
gation to agencies as well as judicial review can be understood in the
context of these four types. Differences across administrative law
agencies can be framed in the context of our model. They respond to
strategic choices in different institutional contexts that reflect differ-
ent costs in drafting statutes and aligning preferences between
agency and principal.
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APPENDIX
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broad \narow broad narrow
delegation delegation delegation delegation
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play it \apply play it apply play it applyplay it apply
safe expertne safe expertise safe expertise safe expertise
COU RT i x
This diagram represents the interactions of legislature, agency,
and court as an extensive form game-that is, a game in which play-
ers make moves sequentially. The game tree maps the choices
available to players, represented as the branches of the tree, starting
from the initial node (the circle with the white center). For instance,
in the first two moves of the game, the legislature must choose the
scope of judicial review (broad or narrow), and the scope of delegation
to the agency (broad or narrow). The agency then must choose how to
apply discretion, and so on. The strategies players chose will depend
on the payoffs they expect from each possible outcome of the game.
The payoffs will, in turn, depend on which of the four institutional
configurations identified in Table 1 is involved. In the diagram, we
have marked in bold the equilibrium outcome we generally expect in
a low-autonomy agency, high-autonomy court regime, such as
France.
A few additional observations about the game tree are in order.
The shaded areas around the agency's "apply expertise" branch indi-
cate that the application of expertise can lead to a range of
substantive outcomes. Also, a possible equilibrium outcome that is
difficult to depict graphically involves players choosing mixed strate-
gies; that is, alternating between strategies in different iterations of
[Vol. 62
2014] EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 33
the game. As noted above, we predict mixed strategies in the case of
the high-autonomy agency, high-autonomy court regime. Lastly, the
game tree cannot represent the phenomenon we predict in Part IV.C.
above: courts seeking to broaden the scope of their review beyond
what was intended by the legislature.
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